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1. Introduction
Normative naturalism is, to a first approximation, the view that there are normative facts and
properties,  and these fall  into the class of natural facts and properties.1 Specific forms of
naturalism may come with additional semantic, epistemological, or other commitments. At its
core,  however,  normative  naturalism is  a  metaphysical  doctrine.  But  many  objections  to
naturalism rely on additional assumptions about language or thought. My aim in this paper is
to make two (largely distinct) contributions to debates about how normative properties might
figure in language and thought if normative naturalism is true.
The  first  part  of  the  paper  focuses  on  an  assumption  I’ll  call  Non-Normative
Representability (NNR). To a first approximation, NNR says that nothing counts as a natural
property unless it can be expressed, or represented, or ascribed with wholly non-normative
terms  or  concepts.  Paradigmatic  non-normative  terms  include  ‘is  tubular’,  ‘has  low  air
pressure’, and ‘promotes survival’. The upshot of NNR for normative properties is that their
being natural  depends  on  whether  they  can  be  ascribed not  only  by  normative  terms  or
concepts, such as ‘ought’, ‘wrong’, and ‘good’, but also by non-normative terms or concepts.
Many naturalists  accept  this.  But Nicholas Sturgeon (2003) has  argued that NNR isn’t  a
commitment of normative naturalism as such. The point is  worth laboring because it  has
important ramifications but it keeps getting ignored. I’ll improve on Sturgeon’s statement of
NNR a bit and illustrate what’s at stake by explaining how a wide range of objections to
normative naturalism presuppose NNR (§2). I’ll then offer reasons, Sturgeon’s and my own,
why the truth of normative naturalism doesn’t require NNR and why NNR is questionable
 This is a preprint of a paper forthcoming in Organon F (https://www.organonf.com/). Please cite the official 
version when available.
1 I use ‘normative’ to cover both the deontic and the evaluative. I’ll understand properties as entities that 
characterize the objects which have them. I use ‘property’ broadly to cover also relations. I’ll take a fact to 
be an entity, a state of affairs, which concerns objects exemplifying properties or standing in relations. 
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enough for naturalists  to have reason to keep their  distance since they can (§3).  I’ll  also
discuss why this needn’t mean losing our grip on the notion of a natural property (§4). 
The second part  of  the paper  offers a  slightly sideways approach to  the “just  too
different” objection to normative naturalism. Many critics of naturalism think that especially
properties  involving “robust” or “authoritative” normativity  are too different  from (other)
natural properties to also be natural properties. I’ll first suggest that the objection loses some
of its force if normative naturalism isn’t committed to NNR and note difficulties in specifying
the  notion  of  “genuine”  or  “authoritative”  normativity  which  is  the  objection’s  primary
concern (§5). Some notions of such authority are too weak to support the objection, but many
stronger notions are question-begging. I’ll then pick a particular authoritatively normative
concept which falls somewhere in the middle to give a proof of concept that naturalists have
no distinctive trouble making sense of thought and talk involving authoritative normativity
(§6). This strategy doesn’t  require rejecting NNR, but avoids some headaches without it.
Thus, I’ll focus throughout on forms of normative naturalism which needn’t accept NNR.2 
2. Non-Normative Representability and Objections to Naturalism
To  get  a  better  grip  on  Non-Normative  Representability  and  what’s  at  stake  in  it,  it’s
instructive to consider some objections to normative naturalism which presuppose NNR. 
The observation that discussions of normative naturalism often presuppose NNR isn’t
original  to  me.  In  its  standard  interpretations,  G.  E.  Moore’s  “open  question”  argument
implies that ‘good’ doesn’t stand for a natural property, roughly on the grounds that it cannot
be analyzed or defined in any wholly non-normative terms (Moore 1903: ch. 1). In a rich
discussion of Moore’s arguments against normative naturalism, Sturgeon notes that we know
from the beginning that ‘good’ is coreferential with itself. It’s only if you assume from the
outset that ‘good’ doesn’t stand for a natural property in its own right that an argument that
‘good’ is indefinable shows that ‘good’ isn’t coreferential with any term whatever standing
for a natural property.3 Sturgeon offers a conjecture regarding why generations of critics have
2 Thus I won’t consider “analytic” naturalism. This implies NNR, since it says that any normative predicate is
analytically equivalent with, and in principle replaceable by, a descriptive, non-normative predicate that 
ascribes the same property. For a sophisticated contemporary form of this view, see Jackson (1998). 
3 Sturgeon (2003: 536). This is a common assumption. William FitzPatrick, for instance, claims that “any 
tempting natural specification of the referent of ‘good’ will focus on something such as human needs, in 
which we naturally take an interest” (2008: 182). This clearly assumes NNR. FitzPatrick then notes that 
goodness is the sort of property that merits our interest and asks “what objective natural fact or facts would 
such a fact about a natural cluster property’s meriting a certain practical response consist in?” (FitzPatrick 
2008: 182). The naturalist can say ‘The fact that it’s good’ or ‘The fact that it merits such a response’. 
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missed that the open question argument begs the question in this way: “I think that the answer
must be that they are relying on an assumption about natural properties that seems to them so
obvious as not to need stating: namely, that nothing counts as a natural property unless we
have some non-ethical  terminology to  represent  it”  (Sturgeon  2003:  536).  Sturgeon  here
states  a  restricted  thesis.  If  we  generalize  his  talk  of  “non-ethical  terminology”  to  non-
normative terminology, we get NNR as a claim about language. I’ll understand it specifically
as a claim about natural languages that can be used by human beings. A further generalization
would extend it to a claim about concepts. I’ll take NNR to be this more general claim.
Sturgeon’s statement of NNR can be improved on in two further respects. First, the
above statement  makes  it  sound like NNR requires  that  we already have  terminology to
represent all natural properties in wholly non-normative terms. But one could well grant that
we don’t yet have such terminology. This is why I initially introduced NNR as the claim that
nothing counts as a natural property unless it  can be expressed, or represented, or ascribed
using wholly non-normative terms or concepts. Accordingly, in what follows I’ll understand
NNR as saying what must be possible in principle if a property is a natural one.4
Second, Sturgeon doesn’t say what counts as representing a property, or what counts
as representing it in non-normative terms. Terms like ‘represent’, ascribe’, and ‘express’ will
likely function as technical terms here. Suppose for illustration that rightness is a natural
property. It shouldn’t be enough for rightness to satisfy NNR that it can be denoted by such
non-normative expressions as ‘the property we’ll be thinking about in class today’ or ‘the
Pope’s favorite property’.5 (That normative properties can be denoted in this way doesn’t
show normative non-naturalism to be false!) Giving a satisfactory account of why this should
be so is tricky, though. But one intuitive difference is that the above descriptions don’t pick
out rightness “in their own right” in some sense, whereas ‘right’ does.6 This difference can be
seen also  in  the following example from Matti  Eklund: “Suppose that an alien linguistic
community introduces into their language a word – ‘thgir’ – with the stipulation that ‘thgir’ is
to ascribe the property that our ‘right’ ascribes, but this community does not in any way use
their  word  ‘thgir’ normatively”  (Eklund  2017:  75).  The  status  of  rightness  as  a  natural
property shouldn’t  depend on whether  a predicate like ‘thgir’ is  possible.  So again NNR
4 In some other passages, Sturgeon seems to have in mind a claim about what’s possible in principle.
5 Jackson (1998: 119) distinguishes “denoting” a property from “ascribing” it in this kind of way.
6 Whether ‘good’ or ‘right’ ascribes a normative or a non-normative property may vary with context. Even so,
the kind of contextual input that’s involved in determining their reference looks different from that involved 
in determining when ‘the property we’ll be thinking about in class today’ denotes rightness. 
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should require that if a non-normative term or concept ‘F’ ascribes N, it does so in its own
right. Introducing ‘thgir’ requires appeal to ‘right’, so it fails this condition.7 I’m not sure just
how to spell out the relevant notion of “in its own right”, but I hope the basic idea is intuitive
enough. This condition on ascription or representation doesn’t imply that if NNR is true, then
normative concepts or properties are reducible to ones expressible in wholly non-normative
terms – at least not for any notion of reduction stronger than necessary equivalence. Nor does
NNR settle by fiat the question whether the relevant notion of being normative is primarily a
feature of terms and concepts, or of the facts and properties they express.8 
Many  objections  to  naturalism  question  the  possibility  of  ascribing  normative
properties in non-normative terms which satisfy these conditions. Moore’s illustrations of the
open question argument are like this. Another example is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection
against normative naturalism. Its core is that the central claims of normative naturalism must
take the form of statements of identity between normative and natural properties, but no such
claim can have all of the features, such as informativeness, required by the truth of normative
naturalism (Parfit 2011: 344). One response is to argue that Parfit’s objection can be met on
its own terms (Dowell and Sobel 2017). But we might instead note that according to Parfit,
the  truth  of  normative  naturalism  requires  informative  identity  statements  of  the  form
‘NORM=NAT’,  where  ‘NORM’ is  placeholder  for  a  normative  term  and  ‘NAT’ is  a
placeholder for a simple or complex expression that ascribes a natural property. He correctly
points out that if normative naturalism is true, then ‘NORM’ ascribes a natural property. He
also  correctly  points  out  that  substituting  ‘NORM’ for  ‘NAT’ would  make  the  identity
statement uninformative. He concludes that an informative identity statement of this form
requires that ‘NAT’ be a non-normative expression. So it’s clear that Parfit accepts NNR, or at
least  attributes  it  to  his  target  (see also Parfit  2011:  295).  Suspend NNR, and normative
naturalism doesn’t require true informative identity statements of the form ‘NORM=NAT’. 
A more recent example is Matt Bedke’s argument that normative naturalism makes
normative cognition  dispensable.  By normative  cognition,  Bedke means thought  and talk
involving concepts or terms such as ‘ought’ or ‘is good’, whose occurrent tokenings have a
7 The same point may apply to the idea that if (as many naturalists think) normative properties play a causal 
role and if R is the causal role of rightness, then rightness can be represented non-normatively as ‘the 
property that fills causal role R’. For we may have to use ‘right’ to specify R. 
8 The issue will arise again in §6. For the general debate, see e.g. Roberts (2013) and Eklund (2017: chs. 4-5).
Finlay (2019) is a helpful overview of various things that ‘normative’ may mean when applied to concepts, 
judgments, properties, and more. Normative naturalists on both sides of NNR differ on whether the 
normative/non-normative distinction is primarily a distinction among concepts or properties.
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special  mode  of  presentation  that  involves  a  sense  of  “inherent,  authoritative  guidance”
(Bedke 2021: 149). His worry is that normative naturalism makes this presentational quality
accidental:  it  is  “not  needed to fit  the job description of normative cognition – ascribing
natural properties. That can be done with non-normative (natural) cognition” (Bedke 2021:
150).9 The naturalist can agree that insofar as a sense of authoritative guidance is integral to
our thought and talk about how to act and live, making it dispensable would be a problem.
But again, NNR is crucial for raising the problem in the first place. Suspend NNR, and non-
normative cognition isn’t guaranteed to suffice for ascribing natural properties. Nor would it
be an accident that if naturalism is true, normative cognition ascribes natural properties. 
There  are  many other  examples.  For  instance,  normative  naturalism is  sometimes
interpreted as saying that normative facts aren’t further facts relative to non-normative facts
(Rosen 2018: 157). But all it implies is that normative facts aren’t further facts that come on
the scene after the natural facts are fixed. This follows trivially, if normative facts are among
the natural facts. I trust that readers familiar  with debates over normative naturalism will
recognize how widely those debates presuppose NNR. It would therefore be important to
debates over normative naturalism if its truth didn’t require NNR.
3. Normative Naturalism without Non-Normative Representability
Normative naturalism is at its core a metaphysical thesis about the nature of normative facts
and properties: they are a kind of natural facts and properties.10 Naturalness in this sense isn’t
a feature of words or concepts that can be used to ascribe those properties. So the core thesis
of normative naturalism doesn’t involve a further thesis about the relation between two sets
of terms, “normative” and “non-normative”. This is so irrespective of whether normativity
and non-normativity are (primarily) features of terms or concepts, or of facts or properties. So
the truth of normative naturalism doesn’t depend on NNR. Naturalists need only claim that
every normative fact is already a natural fact, irrespective of whether there’s a non-normative
way of representing that fact in addition to the normative way. (In §4 I’ll discuss conceptions
of a natural property which allow this possibility.) Jonathan Dancy (2006: 127) dubs this
9 This is how Bedke formulates his concern in relation to the “referential” function of normative concepts. 
For naturalists who appeal instead to a distinctive “non-referential” function, see the references in note 26. 
10 Normative naturalism might have some semantic implications. Perhaps if killing is bad and that’s a natural 
fact, then any sentence which represents the fact that killing is bad is true. This is hardly distinctive.
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view “one-term naturalism”, in contrast to “two-term naturalism” which endorses the further
linguistic or conceptual commitments of NNR.11 
Many naturalists do adopt the two-term naturalist project of identifying which natural
properties are normative properties in non-normative terms (Railton 1986; Boyd 1988; Copp
1995). It’s true, but trivial, that to be wrong is to be wrong. It would be non-trivial if to be
wrong were to fail  to maximally promote the objective interests  of everyone,  impartially
considered  (Railton  1986),  or  interfere  with  the  flourishing  of  societies  (Copp 1995),  or
destabilize cooperation (Sterelny and Fraser  2017).  Property identifications  like these are
empirical hypotheses about which natural properties the normative properties are likely to be,
given certain non-normatively characterizable functions which morality and other normative
codes play in human life (Isserow ms). They invite the kinds of objections canvassed above.
I’m not arguing against two-term naturalism. I simply note that defending such identifications
isn’t necessary to the truth of naturalism. Without NNR, those objections fall away.12 
Sturgeon  finds  NNR  “highly  questionable:  possibly  false,  and  at  the  very  least
requiring defense” (Sturgeon 2003: 537). He appeals to the idea that normative naturalism
isn’t in the first instance a doctrine about language – nor, we might add, about thought. He
also notes analogies which counsel caution about NNR. One is that physicalism about the
mental doesn’t require that mental states be representable, even in principle, in the language
of physics (Sturgeon 2003: 537). Our account of how mental states can be physical states
needn’t  take  such  a  form.  Another  concerns  metaphysical  properties,  including  divine
goodness. If they couldn’t be represented in non-normative terms, that wouldn’t disqualify
them from being metaphysical  properties.  This  gives us  additional  reason to “ask why a
property’s being natural should depend on this” (Sturgeon 2003: 540). We have no reason to
suppose NNR is true because of something special about representing natural properties in
particular. In a different context, Sturgeon notes that scientific progress involves introducing
new terms for previously unrecognized properties all the time, and it’s controversial whether
this process of terminological innovation has an end, even in principle (Sturgeon 2006: 99). 
More  generally,  it  seems  possible  for  natural  properties  to  exceed  even  our  best
representational resources, non-normative or otherwise. Any natural language can have only
11 Arguments for two-term naturalism might include arguments for the reducibility of normative properties 
(Railton 1986), arguments from supervenience (Jackson 1998), or arguments from requirements on coherent
planning (Gibbard 2003). These arguments don’t show that the truth of normative naturalism requires NNR.
12 An individual naturalist can of course go ahead defending an informative property identification if they 
consider that important on some further ground. Establishing some such identification just wouldn’t be 
necessary to the truth of normative naturalism, but more like an add-on to your basic meal deal.
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countably many predicates, but natural properties might not be only countably many. Some
natural properties might also be more fine-grained than what natural languages or human
thought can represent. Examples might include the most maximally determinate values along
certain continuous physical parameters. In general, any representation abstracts from some
features of its object; otherwise it duplicates rather than represents the object. At least the
latter point remains even if NNR requires only that for any natural property N, there’s a non-
normative predicate in some or other natural language which ascribes N. These points matter
because NNR seems to imply that if  there are some properties which we’re incapable of
representing at all, those properties won’t be natural. If a property’s being natural depended
on whether it can be represented in certain kind of way, why should properties that we can’t
represent be exempt from this requirement? Why not instead adopt a conception of a natural
property which doesn’t impose NNR-style representational conditions? We would in any case
need such independent conditions for a property to be natural if we wanted to allow that the
class of natural properties includes properties which we cannot represent.
The above points  all  concern natural  properties of whatever  kind,  not  specifically
normative properties. They imply on very general grounds that whether normative properties
fall into the class of natural properties doesn’t depend on how those properties relate to non-
normative representations. I don’t take these considerations to establish that NNR is false.
The matters are complex enough that it would be folly to take them as settled. For instance,
it’s plausible that all of the paradigmatic natural properties that we can represent are ones we
can represent in non-normative terms. Perhaps this is best explained by NNR.13 People are
likely to vary regarding whether the above considerations suffice to defeat that inference. But
for my purposes I  don’t  need to  show that  NNR is  false,  but  only that  it’s  questionable
enough for normative naturalists to have reason to keep their distance since they can. I take
the above to  show this  much.  There may also be further  worries  about  NNR as  applied
specifically to normative properties. One example would be if naturalists thought that some
normative properties, such as wrongness, are somehow essentially normative. However, such
views are more commonly raised as objections to normative naturalism. (I’ll return to this in
§5.)  Another  potential  example  is  the  view  that  the  extensions  of  normative  terms  and
13 Thanks to a reviewer for this journal for pressing this response. They also worried that the most salient 
naturalistic accounts of reference-determination support a case for NNR. I don’t think the issue is nearly as 
clear-cut, but cannot address this properly for reasons of space. (For one relevant point, see the end of §6.)  
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concepts aren’t unified under non-normative similarity relations. If this “shapelessness thesis”
is compatible with normative naturalism, that might be another reason to worry about NNR.14
4. Naturalness and Non-Normative Representability
One concern about divorcing normative naturalism from NNR is that we might lose our grip
on  the  sense  in  which  normative  properties  are  supposed  to  be  natural.  Why think  that
normative properties fall into the class of natural properties, if that doesn’t happen in virtue of
how normative properties are related to properties which are fairly uncontroversially natural
and can be ascribed in non-normative terms? The main issue for my purposes is this: one-
term naturalism requires a conception of a natural property on which normative properties
meet the conditions for naturalness directly, rather than in virtue of how our normative ways
of representing them are related to non-normative representations.  The good news is  that
none of the three most  prominent  accounts in  metaethics of which properties are  natural
properties implies that any plausible normative naturalism must accept NNR.15
Suppose that any property that is such as to play a causal role in the natural world (or
else figure in causal explanations of events or states of affairs) is a natural property. Whether
something plays a causal role doesn’t depend on how we describe it. So normative properties
like goodness and wrongness qualify as natural in their own right if they play a causal role in
the  world,  even  if  they  cannot  thereby  be  represented  in  wholly  non-normative  terms.
Sturgeon suggests that “placing a property in a causal network is a way of saying something
about which property it is, even if one lacks an explicit reduction for it”  (Sturgeon 2006:
100). It’s  of  course controversial  whether  normative properties  meet  this  condition  or  its
stronger  sibling  which  requires  an  ineliminable causal  or  explanatory  role.16 It’s  also
controversial  whether  the satisfaction of  the  relevant  explanatory  condition by normative
properties entails the metaphysical claims of normative naturalism (Sinclair 2011). But these
aren’t debates about whether a plausible normative naturalism must accept NNR. 
Or,  suppose  a  natural  property  is  such  that  synthetic  propositions  about  its
instantiation aren’t strongly a priori but are subject to empirical constraint (Copp 2003: 181;
Boyd 1988). If normative properties met this condition, they would do so in their own right:
the propositions to be tested would be propositions including normative concepts. Specifying
14 Väyrynen (2014) argues that the shapelessness thesis is compatible with ethical naturalism, doesn’t require 
normative particularism, and can be explained by more general factors not specific to the normative.
15 Copp (2003) and Väyrynen (2009) survey the main options relevant to metaethical debates.
16 For a classic exchange on how to test the matter, see Sturgeon (1985; 1986) vs. Harman (1986).  
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how propositions about the instantiation of a property can come to be known, and how their
justification may be defeated, is again a way of saying something about which property it is.
Whether our basic moral knowledge is strongly a priori is a familiar debate, of course. But
it’s not a debate about whether a plausible normative naturalism must accept NNR. 
Or, suppose that any property posited in the best scientific  accounts of the world  is
natural (Shafer-Landau 2003: 59). In the case of morality, naturalists argue that there is an
empirical discipline which deals with ethical matters and is no less apt to figure in the best
scientific accounts of the world than psychology or sociology – namely, a  discipline called
ethics (Boyd 1988: 206-8; Sturgeon 2003: 553).17 If ethics had such a disciplinary status, then
establishing principles linking non-normative properties to normative ones through first-order
normative  inquiry  would  be  a  way  of  saying  something  about  which  natural  properties
goodness and rightness are even if those connections aren’t so robust as to satisfy NNR. It’s
of course controversial whether ethics has this kind of disciplinary status. But that’s again not
a debate about whether a plausible normative naturalism must accept NNR. 
I conclude that the most prominent accounts of natural properties in debates about
normative naturalism and non-naturalism don’t imply that we’ll lose our grip on the notion of
a natural property if plausible forms of normative naturalism needn’t accept NNR. So no new
reason has emerged to treat NNR as a condition on the truth of normative naturalism. 
5. The “Just Too Different” Objection
I’ll  now  turn  to  the  “just  too  different”  (JTD)  objection  to  normative  naturalism.  The
objection  has  it  that  the  things  we represent  in  normative  ways  are,  intuitively,  just  too
different from the things we represent in non-normative ways for them to be metaphysically
of a kind. As Dancy puts it:  “There remains a stubborn feeling that [normative] facts about
what is right or wrong, what is good or bad, and what we have reason to do have something
distinctive in common, and that this common feature is something that a natural fact could
not have” (Dancy 2006: 136).18 For instance, nothing can count as good or right unless it’s
something that we ought to be concerned to promote, or merits being given a certain kind of
17 Several normative naturalists suggest that health is an evaluative concept which picks out a property that 
plays genuine explanatory roles (Bloomfield 2001; Sturgeon 2003: 553; Railton 2018: 51) and so there are 
uncontroversially naturalistic disciplines that deal with questions of value. This requires a view of “thick” 
concepts which is widely endorsed but which I myself find questionable (Väyrynen 2013; cf. Cline 2015).  
18 See also Nagel (1986: 138), FitzPatrick (2008: 179-82), Enoch (2011: 104-8), and Parfit (2011: 324-27). I 
won’t be able to do justice to various nuances that can be found in these and other discussions of the just-
too-different objection. For a helpful survey of the debate, see Paakkunainen (2017).
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weight in deliberation, or the like. Paradigmatic natural facts – ranging from facts of physics
and chemistry to non-normative facts about the colors of objects, the needs and desires of
human and non-human animals, and the like – aren’t like that. So why think that facts with
the kind of special importance that normative facts seem to have are metaphysically of a kind
with paradigmatic non-normative natural facts which lack such importance?  
The  JTD objection  can  be  raised  against  both  one-term naturalism and  two-term
naturalism, since it relies on a contrast between properties represented in normative terms and
properties represented in paradigmatically non-normative terms. But I suspect the objection
derives at least some of its force from assuming that normative naturalism is committed to
NNR.  An  intuitive  contrast  between  paradigmatic  non-normative  natural  properties  and
properties  like  rightness  and  wrongness  is  less  compelling  as  an  objection  to  normative
naturalism if properties can be natural without conforming to non-normative paradigms like
fermentation, color, need, or desire. That paradigmatic members of class C lack feature F
does little by itself to show that C doesn’t have a subclass whose members do have F. The
residual force of the objection depends on what counts as the kind of normative importance
which is supposed to set normative facts apart from (other) natural facts. The more distinctive
normative facts are from these other facts in this respect, the more forceful the concern.
Words like ‘good’, ‘right’, and ‘ought’ are often used to express forms of normativity
which are naturalistically acceptable. These include norm-relative normativity characteristic
of  conventional  norms  (law,  etiquette)  and  role  obligations  (such  as  what’s  required  of
teachers),  kind-relative  normativity  (such  as  being  a  good  toaster),  and  instrumental
normativity.19 These all involve standards such that if you fail to satisfy them, you’re open to
a certain kind of criticism. So if the special features that are supposed to make it implausible
that normative properties fall into the class of natural properties were exhibited also by these
normative properties, naturalists needn’t worry. It’s thus no surprise that the JTD objection
tends to focus on a subclass of normative notions, such as being morally right or wrong, what
one has normative reason to do, what one really ought to do, and the like. Their normativity
has struck many as more “genuine” or “authoritative” than these other kinds of normativity. 
Genuine or authoritative normativity is often characterized in terms of a distinctive
role. Authoritatively normative concepts or judgments play some characteristic or essential
19 See e.g. Paakkunainen (2017: 3) and the references therein. Not everyone thinks that these forms of non-
categorical normativity are less puzzling than categorical normativity. How exactly this might relate to 
normative naturalism is a more complex issue than I can address here, however.
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role in deliberation. Authoritatively normative facts and properties have some characteristic
or  essential  connection  to  decision  and action.  Proposals  vary  in  terms  of  whether  such
connections are themselves normative. Either way, they are supposed to be different in kind
from how both non-authoritative forms of normativity and non-normative notions may relate
to deliberation and action. But it has proved difficult to pin down just what connections are
meant  to  characterize  robust  or  authoritative  normativity.  As  Hille  Paakkunainen  notes:
“There’s currently little agreement on hallmarks of genuine normative importance – beyond,
perhaps, certain intranormative connections between important normative notions” (2017: 9). 
A common way to illustrate the JTD objection is to say that some normative facts,
such as moral facts, are intrinsically significant in that any rational agent will have normative
reason to respond accordingly. If such categorical reasons were a hallmark of the normative
authority of morality, then normative naturalism would seem hard pressed to account for its
authority. For many think that this kind of categorical normativity isn’t compatible with a
naturalistic world view. But we should distinguish two questions here. One is whether it’s
true  that,  no  matter  what  the  moral  facts  are  like  and  what  moral  agents  and  their
environments  are  like,  any  moral  agent  will  by  necessity  have  normative  reason  to  act
morally. The other is whether the idea that moral facts are categorically reason-giving is a
firm datum whose denial automatically implies a significant loss of plausibility. 
Even if  it’s  true  that  moral  facts  in  fact  are  necessarily  reason-giving,  that  claim
amounts to a substantive theoretical position,  not a pre-theoretical  datum. The claim that
moral facts are reason-giving is logically weaker than the claim that they are necessarily so.
Why then  think  the  latter  is  a  firm  default?  Many  naturalists  argue  that  genuinely  pre-
theoretical data about the importance that our normative practices assign to moral facts can be
accounted for even if our reasons to be moral obtain contingently. Such explanations typically
take the following form. Given (i) some plausible assumptions about what kind of social and
emotional factors are robust features of human social environments and psychology and (ii)
some plausible first-order moral assumptions, it’s a robust empirical generalization that moral
agents have normative reason to do what’s good and avoid what’s bad (Brink 1984; Railton
1986; Boyd 1988; Copp 1995; Isserow ms). The kind of reasons internalism that underpins
these explanations doesn’t imply that our reasons for doing what morality tells us to do are
merely instrumental (cf. Williams 1981). The contingency of such reasons also needn’t be
contingency on fragile preferences or desires. The relevant generalization may break down in
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highly anomalous cases – ideally coherent Caligulas or the like. But such individuals would
be so far removed from most of us that it’s unclear why their existence should be a threat to
the normative authority of morality. It wouldn’t be accidental that most of us, most of the
time, have reason to do what morality tells us to do. 
My aim here is to indicate how naturalists explain the importance that our normative
practices assign to moral facts in terms of reasons to be moral that obtain as a matter of robust
and deep contingency, not to defend these accounts. What I want to highlight is that such
accounts can satisfy certain independently plausible conditions on normative authority which
require  less  than  treating  moral  facts  as  necessarily  reason-giving.  For  instance,  William
FitzPatrick suggests that the significance of what various forms of non-normative inquiry
(such  as  biology,  psychology,  and  sociology)  can  contribute  to  moral  inquiry  “must  be
assessed  through  the  lens  of  autonomous  ethical  reflection  on  our  life  and  experience”
because “nothing presented to a rational agent in any other way could be authoritative  for
her”  (FitzPatrick  2008:  172).  Normative  naturalists  can  well  accept  that  assessing  the
significance of potential inputs into moral inquiry is a central task of normative thought and
talk.  Especially  if  (but  perhaps  not  only  if)  we  don’t  reply  on  NNR,  non-normative
representations of natural properties may not suffice for this task. Any field of inquiry seems
“theory-dependent”  in  its  reliance  on  auxiliary  theoretical  assumptions,  including  some
drawn from that very field (Boyd 1988: 190, 207). For a simple example in ethics, consider a
modest moral principle: no morally admirable person would instigate and oversee the deaths
of millions of people. And consider a moral claim which some people accept: Hitler was a
morally admirable person. These two moral claims jointly yield an empirical consequence:
Hitler didn’t instigate and oversee the deaths of millions of people. But it’s an empirical fact
that he did. So we know, on the basis of empirical test, that at least one of these moral claims
must be rejected.20 The empirical constraint doesn’t say which one to reject. But that’s par for
the course: claims are assessed in bundles, not singly in isolation.  So naturalists can agree
that autonomous ethical reflection is required to assess which moral claims we should reject. 
A deadlock  now  threatens  the  debate  about  the  JTD  objection.  It’s  dialectically
inadmissible for the objection to presuppose that moral facts are necessarily or categorically
reason-giving.  But  the  objection  fails  under  various  weaker  notions  of  authoritative
normativity, such as those characterized in terms of deliverances of autonomous normative
20 Nick Sturgeon used this example in an undergraduate lecture on normative ethics which I once sat in on. 
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reflection.  Naturalists may also be able to accommodate a robust sense in which genuine
norms are inescapable. (For instance, they might adapt proposals from Woods 2018.) And
they can accept that wrongness, for instance, is authoritatively normative in the sense that it
involves violations of important standards which warrant blame, other things being equal
(Copp 2020a).  Whether normative properties are just too different from natural properties
depends  on  what’s  packed  into  a notion  of  authoritative  normativity  which  it  would  be
dialectically admissible for the JTD objection to deploy. The jury’s still out on that.
6. Authoritative Normativity in Thought and Talk
I’ll now offer a slightly sideways approach to the JTD objection. I’ll sketch a kind of proof of
concept that  normative naturalism faces no distinctive trouble making sense of thought and
talk involving authoritative normativity.  I’ll do this by showing how naturalists can make
sense  of  a  certain  type  of  authoritatively  normative  concept  if  they  so  desire.  Whatever
trouble naturalism may face will be of a sort faced by other metaethical views as well. While
I hope that the concept I’ll focus on is representative, I won’t be able to show that the strategy
generalizes to further notions of authoritative normativity that I haven’t discussed.21 
This  strategy speaks  to  the  JTD objection  even though the  objection  is  normally
framed in terms of normative facts and properties rather than terms or concepts. As noted in
§2,  there’s  a  dispute  about  whether  being  normative  is  primarily  a  feature  of  terms  and
concepts, or of the facts and properties they express. On the one hand, if normative properties
are normative because of some features of the terms or concepts that  ascribe them, then
making naturalist sense of authoritative normativity is primarily a task of making naturalist
sense of thought and talk involving authoritative normativity. If normative properties instead
are normative because of some features of non-representational reality, we would still expect
our  thought  and  talk  about  such  properties  somehow  to  reflect  whatever  connection  to
decision  and action marks  a  fact  or  property as  authoritatively normative.  Either  way,  if
naturalists  can  make  sense  of  thought  and  talk  involving  authoritative  normativity,  then
nothing in its nature shows that the properties ascribed by such thought and talk are just too
21 Another limitation is that I set aside first-order questions about which standards or facts are authoritatively 
normative. For one such first-order account, see Rowland (forthcoming). That account seems compatible 
with normative naturalism. A broader question here is whether it’s better to think of authoritatively 
normative oughts (if there are any) as exemplifying a distinct ought-concept (or concepts) or as combining 
an exemplification of some independently possessable ought-concept (MORAL OUGHT, or the like) with a 
higher-order property of being authoritatively normative in some sense (for this distinction, see Howard and
Laskowski ms). I hope my discussion to be modifiable to fit either model.
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different from (other) natural properties to be natural properties themselves. This should also
enable naturalists to explain why such thought and talk might be not only indispensable for
thinking about authoritatively normative facts, but also important. The strategy is available to
both  one-term and  two-term naturalists.  (The  latter  would  need  to  show that  normative
concepts  are  indispensable  for,  for  example,  deliberation  or  normative  knowledge  even
though everything that can be said in normative terms about what the world is like can also in
principle be said in wholly non-normative terms.22) But  it comes with one less headache to
normative naturalists who aren’t committed to NNR: making naturalist sense of thought and
talk involving authoritative normativity doesn’t require showing that the properties it ascribes
can in principle be also ascribed in wholly non-normative terms. 
I’ll  explain  the  strategy  I  have  in  mind  in  terms  of  an  authoritatively  normative
concept  individuated  by  its  distinctive  role  in  the  deliberative  activity  of  non-arbitrary
selection.  This is  the concept Tristram McPherson labels  PRACTICAL OUGHT:  a normative
concept which has distinctive authority because it’s “the concept of a norm which is the norm
to appeal to in the context of non-arbitrary selection” (McPherson 2018: 267; cf. McPherson
2020).23 When morality requires one thing but prudence requires something else, a resolution
of their  relative importance had better  be non-arbitrary,  and a  norm that  provides such a
solution would seem to lord over the norms whose conflict it resolves. This might be the
concept  that  some  call  the  concept  of  ought  simpliciter.24 It  looks  like  a  dialectically
admissible  tool  for  assessing  whether  normative  naturalism  can  make  sense  of  how
authoritative normativity figures in our normative thought and talk. 
Normative naturalism has no distinctive trouble making sense of how this  sort  of
authoritative normativity figures in language.  The talk you sometimes see of “the special
nature of normative words” is misleading. There are no normative words (not in English
anyway) in the strong sense of words that are conventionally associated with, specifically,
authoritative normativity. Rather, there are words that can be used normatively, in various
senses of ‘normative’. Which sort of claim a given assertive utterance of a word like ‘ought’,
‘wrong’, or ‘good’ expresses depends on the context of utterance, in a potentially complex
22 This is the standard two-term naturalist strategy. Its most common form is to say that normative concepts 
are distinguished by a kind of conceptual role which non-normative concepts are of a wrong kind to serve. 
23 I use small caps to denote concepts. To be clear, my discussion here concerns the concept McPherson 
(2018) dubs PRACTICAL OUGHT, not his particular analysis of it. 
24 Some philosophers are skeptical of ought simpliciter (Baker 2018; Copp 2020b; Howard and Laskowski 
ms). If they’re right, normative naturalism faces no challenge from authoritative normativity in this sense. 
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sort of way.25 In some contexts ‘ought’ expresses PRACTICAL OUGHT. But in many contexts it
expresses forms of non-authoritative normativity that are (as we saw above) widely agreed to
be naturalistically acceptable. The latter entails that the context-invariant features of what
‘ought’ means are  compatible  with  normative  naturalism.  Nor does  normative naturalism
conflict with features specific to contexts in which ‘ought’ expresses PRACTICAL OUGHT, such
as the notion of “the norm to appeal to” or the notion of non-arbitrary selection. 
Getting the relevant ought into thought is slightly more fraught. One option is that
authoritative normativity figures in ways of thinking about normative properties which don’t
amount  to  distinct  concepts  or  modes  of  presentation  for  them  but  instead  play  some
indispensable  non-referential  function.26 I’ll  instead  explain  how  naturalists  have  no
distinctive trouble making sense of a distinct concept like PRACTICAL OUGHT. Here’s the key
point: any concept like  PRACTICAL OUGHT must involve an ordering of the items that are
relevantly live options in the given context. The ought-structure is in general such that what
you ought to do is one among the top options on the contextually relevant ordering of the
relevantly live options. That’s what falls out of the standard sort of descriptive semantics for
‘ought’ in deontic contexts, broadly in the vein of Kratzer (1991). There’s no reason to think
that PRACTICAL OUGHT is an exception. ‘Ought’ can be used to express it. More importantly,
if  PRACTICAL OUGHT didn’t  involve an ordering,  it  couldn’t  play its  role  in non-arbitrary
selection when requirements of morality conflict with the law, when promoting the interests
of  one’s  beloved  conflict  with  fairness,  and  so  on.  So  a  non-defective  application  of
PRACTICAL OUGHT commits  the  thinker  to  there  being  a  certain  kind  of  ordering  which
somehow gets uniquely selected in the context of application. (Uniqueness is required if that
ordering  is  to  be  the norm to  appeal  to  in  non-arbitrary  selection.  In  what  follows,  I’ll
simplify presentation by assuming that uniqueness is baked into non-arbitrariness.) 
What ordering is this? Ought-concepts are individuated in part (though perhaps not
wholly) by the orderings they involve. MORAL OUGHT and PRUDENTIAL OUGHT are different
concepts if (though perhaps not only if) they rank options by different criteria. Structurally
speaking  PRACTICAL OUGHT looks no different;  it’s  individuated in  part  in  relation to  an
ordering (whichever it is) that provides a basis for successful non-arbitrary selection among
the relevantly live options in the context. Content-wise, PRACTICAL OUGHT doesn’t encode a
25 In not saying more about this, I’m skipping many complex issues regarding the semantics and 
metasemantics of these terms and their context-sensitivity. In other work I argue that the practical role of 
terms like ‘ought’ isn’t a feature of their descriptive semantics or metasemantics (Väyrynen forthcoming). 
26 For such accounts, see Copp (2018; 2020a) and Laskowski (2019). For some objections, see Bedke (2021). 
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specific ordering or its source. But  MORAL OUGHT doesn’t do so either; it’s a substantive
question what the correct moral standards are. So it’s hardly distinctive of PRACTICAL OUGHT
that  specifying  how  the  relevantly  live  options  rank  will  require  substantive  normative
inquiry and is subject to dispute and disagreement. Ought-structure in general and PRACTICAL
OUGHT in  particular  may also do little  to  restrict  what  considerations  may coherently be
treated as relevant to what one practically ought to do. This concept’s contribution to the
content of thoughts that token it may accordingly be informatively fairly thin – something
like a condition characterizable as  ranking highly on an ordering,  whichever it  is,  which
provides a basis for successful non-arbitrary selection among the relevantly live options. 
These  are  wholly  general  points  about  PRACTICAL OUGHT. As  broadly  structural
points,  they’re  largely  neutral  between  a  wide  range  of  metaethical  views,  realist  and
antirealist alike. This should already lead us to expect that normative naturalism should have
no distinctive trouble accounting for PRACTICAL OUGHT thoughts. But to check this, let’s look
at issues where different metaethical views might differ, ontology aside. There are issues in
the philosophy of mind, such as what kind of mental state someone’s in when they judge that
they practically ought to do something. And there are issues in metasemantics, such as in
virtue of what factors  PRACTICAL OUGHT comes to pick out the property of ranking highly
among a set of live options on the relevant kind of ordering.27 
As regards philosophy of mind, most naturalists would characterize the judgment that
I practically ought to φ as a belief that φ-ing ranks highly on the relevant kind of ordering. It
isn’t clear why there should be any deep puzzle as to how such a belief  could serve the
deliberative role of PRACTICAL OUGHT.28 If I believe that I practically ought to do something,
I’m committed to thinking that a certain resolution to my practical situation is correct. That’s
just built into the ordering which induces that resolution. It’s a further question whether I’m
genuinely committed let alone motivated to act that way. Just as sharing a normative concept
may not require a lot of uniformity in inputs to its application, it may not require a lot of
uniformity in the practical upshots of its application (cf. Merli 2009). 
As  regards  metasemantics,  normative  naturalists  of  course  have  work  to  do  in
explaining the reference of concepts like PRACTICAL OUGHT. If PRACTICAL OUGHT stands for
ranking highly on a certain kind of ordering, there are questions about whether that property
is natural and how PRACTICAL OUGHT comes to pick it out. Is its reference fixed by how its
27 Or, perhaps, a property meeting a condition so characterized. I won’t distinguish these below for simplicity.
28 Thus I don’t see why McPherson (2020: 1344-45) thinks there’s a deep puzzle here for normative realists. 
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use  is  causally  regulated,  or  its  conceptual  role,  or  the  functions  of  the  representational
systems that use the concept, or some combination of these or other factors? How does the
relevant mechanism fit with what makes a property natural, whether that be playing a causal
role, being empirical, or something else? (This matters especially to one-term naturalists who
need normative properties to meet the conditions for naturalness in their own right.) But these
questions aren’t special to  PRACTICAL OUGHT.  Whether and how normative concepts get to
pick out natural properties just is the general metasemantic question for naturalism, just as
whether and how they get to pick out non-natural properties is the general metasemantic
question for non-naturalism, and likewise for other views in normative metaphysics. 
It’s not clear why normative naturalists should be in any worse position than others in
accounting specifically for  PRACTICAL OUGHT thoughts. One consideration here is that this
concept doesn’t commit us to categorical reasons. The claim that successful non-arbitrary
selection necessarily provides normative reasons for action is a substantive claim not built
into the content of PRACTICAL OUGHT. Another consideration is that normative naturalism is
no  worse  off  in  ensuring  that  PRACTICAL OUGHT has  an acceptably  determinate
representational content.29 For this concept to have a non-empty extension on any view, there
must be an ordering which provides a basis for successful non-arbitrary selection among the
relevantly live options in the context. Some vagueness aside, this should ensure sufficient
determinacy  in  representational  content.  That  the  content  of  the  ordering  is  subject  to
ignorance, uncertainty, and disagreement doesn’t mean that PRACTICAL OUGHT thoughts lack
acceptably determinate content. Finally, if PRACTICAL OUGHT stands for ranking highly on a
certain  kind  of  ordering,  normative  naturalists  needn’t  worry  about  whether  it  can  be
represented in wholly non-normative terms unless they accept NNR. They can also agree that
determining which properties normative concepts refer to may require first-order normative
assumptions.30 There may be no normatively neutral way to determine whether GOOD refers
to goodness even if goodness is a natural property, and likewise for PRACTICAL OUGHT. 
In saying that it’s not clear why normative naturalists should be any worse off here, I
really don’t mean to be bloody-minded. It remains a live question whether there is a natural
property or relation which satisfies a condition like ranks highly on an ordering, whichever it
29 McPherson (2020: 1346-51) argues that ensuring representational determinacy is a serious challenge to 
normative realists. Here I can pick up on only one dimension of the challenge he poses. However, some of 
the dimensions I bracket strike me as less troublesome, since McPherson takes as his foil an overly simple 
sort of causal metasemantics (simpler, say, than the epistemically constrained account in Boyd 1988). 
30 I discuss this briefly in relation to Boyd’s causal metasemantics in Väyrynen (2019: 206-8).
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is, which provides a basis for successful non-arbitrary selection among the relevantly live
options in the given deliberative context, and does so in such a way that PRACTICAL OUGHT
can be said to stand for that property. My point here is that there’s no good reason why this
sort of authoritatively normative property should be just too different from (other) natural
properties  to  itself  be  natural,  given that  normative  naturalism has  no distinctive  trouble
making sense of thoughts involving it. It remains to be seen whether this strategy generalizes
to other relevant authoritatively normative concepts besides  PRACTICAL OUGHT. But on this
proof of concept, issues facing normative naturalism wouldn’t be distinctive. They would be
just the same general issues that face any metasemantics for normative thought and talk. 
7. Conclusion
My aim in this paper has been to contribute to debates about how normative properties might
figure  in  our  thought  and  talk  if  normative  naturalism  is  true.  First,  I  offered  some
improvements on Sturgeon’s formulation of an assumption about representation of natural
properties which I called Non-Normative Representability, and noted several objections to
normative naturalism which presuppose NNR. Second, I offered some reasons, Sturgeon’s
and my own, why the truth of normative naturalism doesn’t require NNR and why NNR is
questionable enough for naturalists to have reason to keep their distance since they can. If
that’s right, the objections in question fall away. Third, I offered a slightly sideways approach
to  the  “just  too  different”  objection  to  normative  naturalism.  I  first  suggested  that  the
objection loses some of its force if normative naturalism isn’t committed to NNR and noted
difficulties in specifying the notion of “genuine” or “authoritative” normativity which is the
objection’s  primary  concern.  I  then  tried  to  make progress  with  a  proof  of  concept  that
naturalists have no distinctive trouble making sense of thought and talk involving the relevant
kind of authoritative normativity. While the strategy is compatible with NNR, its execution
will  prompt  fewer  headaches  if  normative  naturalists  don’t  count  NNR  among  their
commitments. I leave it for future work to assess how well the strategy I offer generalizes.31 
31 I dedicate this paper to the memory of Nick Sturgeon, who was a member of my dissertation committee at 
Cornell University. I wrote it to highlight the significance of some of Nick’s observations about the 
commitments of normative naturalism which its critics often neglect. I’m grateful to David Copp, Camil 
Golub, Jessica Isserow, Gerald Lang, Richard Rowland, a work-in-progress group at University of Leeds, 
the participants of the Value in Language workshop, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments 
on earlier drafts, and to Dan Zeman for inviting me to contribute. 
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